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B. and W.: Hardship as a Defense to Specific Performance in West Virginia
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
HARDSHIP AS A DEFENSE TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE IN WEST VIRGINIA
Like all other forms of equitable relief, specific performance
of a contract is granted in the discretion of the court. In many
cases the relief may be refused because circumstances make it a
hardship on the defendant to perform his contract. The court
governs itself as far as may be by general rules and principles, but
at the same time withholds or grants relief according to the circumstances of each particular case, when these rules and principles
will not furnish any exact measure of justice between the parties.'
The most that can be done is to note the various factors which have
been stressed by the courts in granting or refusing relief. A survey of the West Virginia cases shows them to be in accord with
2
the general authorities on the subject.
The most usual form of hardship is that of inadequacy of
consideration, although it is generally stated that where there is no
unfairness or other equitable defense' specific performance will
not be denied for inadequacy of consideration alone unless it be so
grossly inadequate as to justify the presumption of fraud and
collusion. To justify the presumption, the inadequacy must be so
Between second
Mtonday in February., 1937,
and second Monday in
December, 1938

Period within -which private purchaser at tax sale
must procure his deed. Original owner or person
holding under him may redeem at any time before
deed is procured.

Between April, 1938,
and December, 1939

Within two years after land becomes irredeemable
(four months' notice by publication having been
given), the state commissioner of forfeited lands
(the auditor holding the position ex officio) must
by statute certify a list of such lands to the circuit court.
Suits are instituted to sell property forfeited to
the state. If there is no private purchaser at this
court sale, the sheriff must purchase the land for
the state, and the title to the land so purchased
vests absolutely in the State of West Virginia.
Property may be redeemed at any time before
sale is confirmed.

I Conaway & Smith v. Sweeney, 24 W. Va. 643 (1884) ; Harrison v. Harrison,
36 W. Va. 556, 15 S. E. 87 (1892); Hastings v. Montgomery, 95 W. Va. 734,
122 S. E. 155 (1924); Abbott v. L'Hommedieud, 10 W. Va. 677 (1877).
2 MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY (1936) §§ 67, 69; FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
CoNTRACTs (3d ed. 1884) §§ 397-417.
3 Deepwater Council etc. v. Renick, 59 W. Va. 343, 53 S. E. 552 (1906);
Ralphsnyder v. Titus, 74 W. Va. 204, 82 S. B. 257 (1914) (fiduciary relationship of attorney and client).
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gross as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment.4 Half
the estimated value is not such inadequacy.'
Apparently inadequacy as a negative defense and as an affirmative ground for rescission is governed by the same rule.' In
the case of Duncan v. Duncan,7 P executed certain writings purporting to be deeds in which there was a recited consideration of
one dollar which never passed. P sued to remove cloud on title
and the court held that there was such inadequacy as to prove
fraud, and that P was entitled to have the deeds cancelled.
In Cady v. Gale,8 the property the subject of the contract had
increased in value subsequent thereto because of the discovery of
oil, and D refused to convey according to the terms. The consideration for D's promise was the assignment of a patent right, which
the court found was worth more than the land at the date of the
contract. It is well settled that courts of equity will not withhold
their aid to enforce such contracts merely because of the appreciation or depreciation of the property sold. The question of the
hardship of the contract is to be determined as of the date of the
contract.0
Hardship alone may in some cases justify the refusal of relief, but less hardship will be required where other inequitable in.
cidents are present. Laches accompanied by a change in conditions
and circumstances is a common example of this. In Urpman v.
Lowthler Oil Co., 10 P sought to enforce a contract for the sale of
land after a delay of nine years, during which time the land had
increased greatly due to D's development of the land under an oil
and gas lease from the vendor. It was held that he who seeks performance must have shown himself prompt and willing to comply
4 Conaway & Smith v. Sweeney, 24 W. Va. 643 (1884) ; Whittaker v. South
West Virginia Imp. Co., 34 W. Va. 217, 32 S. E. 507 (1890); Garten v. Layton, 76 W. Va. 63, 84 S. E. 1058 (1915) ; Crotty v. Effler, 60 W. Va. 258, 266,
54 S. E. 345 (1906); Deepwater Council etc. v. Renick, 59 W. Va. 343, 53 S.

E. 552 (1906).

• Bradford v. McConihay, 35 W. Va. 732 (1879).
o Pennybacker v. Laidley, 33 W. Va. 624, 639, 11 S. E. 39 (1890); Erwin
v. Hedrick, 52 W. Va. 537, 544, 44 S. E. 165 (1903).
7 104 W. Va. 600, 140 S. E. 689 (1927).
8 5 W. Va. 547, 565 (1871).
SMCCLMNTocK, EQurir § 69.
10 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903).
Accord: Martin v. Thomas, 56 W.
Va. 220, 227, 49 S. E. 118 (1904); Wellman v. Virginian Ry. Co., 85 W. Va.
169, 101 S. E. 252 (1919); Crawford v. Workman, 64 W. Va. 10, 61 S. E. 319
(1908); Heflin v. Heflin, 63 W. Va. 29, 59 S. E. 745 (1907); Buffalo Coal &
Coke Co. v. Vance, 71 W. Va. 148, 76 S. E. 177 (1912).
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with the terms of the contract on his part. Performance will not
be granted if due to a change in conditions it would be inequitable
or would work a hardship on the defendant or third persons. In
the Urpman case, laches accompanied by the increase in value of
the subject matter was sufficient reason to deny the relief. Similarly, sale by the vendor to a third party after an unreasonable delay by the vendee in asserting his rights under the contract is
sufficient ground for denying relief."'
Hardship to the public is often a factor having great weight
with the courts.

In Harper v. Virginian Ry. Co., 1 2 D, as part of

the consideration for a right-of-way, agreed to maintain on P's
land, a depot for the general public, and P sued for performance
of this agreement. Relief was granted, the court holding that such
agreements will be enforced unless to do so would subordinate
public to private interests or would so hamper the railway company that it could not discharge its duties to the public generally.
Hardship to individuals who are not parties to the contract may
also defeat specific performance."
Courts have frequently made the statement that to be specifically enforceable a contract must be fair and reasonable, but not a
great many cases have had to rely solely on this principle in refusing relief. Almost always when one enters into an unfair or
harsh contract he is induced to do so by some other factor which
justifies refusal of equitable relief. In Eclipse Oil Co. v. South
Penn Oil Co., 4 P induced the lessor to sign a lease, the covenants
of which in reality gave P the right to hold the premises indefinitely if the lessor remained quiet, without either exploration or payment of a definite rental, though apparently binding P to drill or
pay. The court said that it is a settled doctrine of equity that
only those contracts which are fair, just and reasonable will be
specifically enforced, any trace of unfairness rendering specific
11 Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148, 19 S. E. 540, 24 L. R. A. 339 (1894) (the
court found no contract but said, assuming a valid contract for the purpose of
argument, it was not enforceable).
12 76 W. Va. 788, 86 S. E. 919 (1915).
Accord: Brown v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 84 W. Va. 271, 99 S. E. 457 (1919).
13 Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148, 19 S. E. 540 (1894) ; Urpman v. Lowther
Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903).
14 47 W. Va. 84, 34 S. E. 923 (1899).
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performance impossible."' Finding this contract to be unfair and
manifestly one-sided, the court denied relief.
A. L. B.
W. G. W.
THE INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE IN LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES
A thorough search of the law digests will reveal only two
West Virginia decisions' on the law of incontestability clauses in
life inslirance policies,2 those having been decided but recently and
on a single phase of the subject. It is therefore obvious that a
discussion which attempts to consider the West Virginia law on
this topic will be hopefully prophetic rather than critical.
A typical incontestable clause reads:
Incontestability. - This Policy shall be incontestable after
two years from its date of issue except for non-payment of
premium and except as to provisions and conditions
relating
3
to Double Indemnity and Disability Benefits.
Such clauses, peculiar to life insurance policies, are of recent
origin.4 Prior to their adoption, it frequently happened that the
insured, after paying premiums for many years, was found to have
left nothing to his beneficiaries but a disputed claim - the dispute too often being fraudulent. As a consequence, insurance began to lose favor in the eyes of the purchasing public. To induce
future business, 5 the companies began to write into their contracts
a promise that they would not dispute the claim after a period of
time. This developed into the incontestable clause as we lmow
it today - a private period of limitations between the company
and the insured.6
'5 Accord: Starcher v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373, 56 S. E. 524, 9 L. R. A. (N. s.)
913, 123 Am. St. Rep. 990 (1907); Hartigan v. Hartigan, 58 W. Va. 610, 52

S. E. 720 (1906).

1 Morris v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 278, 171 S. E. 740 (1933);
Young v. Home Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 716, 173 S. E. 566 (1933).
2 This statement is verified in a marginal note to Equitable Life etc. Society
v. Deem, 91 P. (2d) 569, 571 (C. C. A. 4th2 1937).
3 Policy of New York Life Insurance Company.
4 COOKE, LIFE INsurANcE (1891) 232 refers to the clause only by a brief
footnote.
See Wright v. Mutual Benefit etc. Co., 118 N. Y. 237, 23 N. E. 186, 6 L. R.
A. 731 (1890), the earliest case interpreting the clause.
6 Mutual Life etc. Co. v. Margolis, 11 Cal. App. (2d) 382, 53 P. (2d) 1017

(1936).
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